Grief Journal : I Will Always Wonder Who You Would Have Been: Pregnancy, Infant, Baby, and Child Loss ~ 6x9 College Ruled Notebook

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So, on Todd’s analysis, to wonder whether the sodium-24 atom will decay in the next 24 h is to wonder whether the unique, actual future contains the decay of the sodium-24 atom. On our current framework, the question that serves as the content of my wondering whether attitude would be Does the unique actual future contain the decaying of the sodium-24 atom? Given Todd’s commitment to the nonexistence of a unique actual future, the question falsely presupposes a unique actual future. With respect to questions like this, there are two approaches available: a Russellian approach and a Strawsonian approach. Footnote 24 I will consider each and argue that both entail that if, as Todd claims, there is no unique actual future, then wondering about future contingents is inappropriate. Suppose Arthur wonders whether the present king of France is bald. Extending the Russellian analysis, the question that serves as the content of Arthur’s interrogative attitude, Is the present king of France bald?, does have a true, complete answer. Footnote 25 The true, complete answer is: There does not exist a present king of France. Footnote 26 Once Arthur learns that there is no present king of France, it is no longer appropriate for him to wonder whether the present king of France is bald. On the Russellian analysis, this inappropriateness follows from (WIN1), since learning that there is no present king of France involves learning the true, complete answer to the question. The same applies to wondering about future contingents on Todd’s account. The question that serves as the content of my wondering about (NA24) has a true, complete answer: There does not exist a unique, actual future. In embracing Todd’s account, I come to know the true, complete answer to the question that serves as the content of my wondering and so, by (WIN1), it is inappropriate for me to continue to wonder about it. https://www.etsy.com/listing/741742631/huge-bundle-big-bundle-clipart-graphics?ref=shop_home_active_5&pro=1 I am clearly a complete drama queen, my loss is minuscule compared to some. What has happened to me is minor and I am acting like it's a tragedy."

This approach rejects bivalence for future contingents and also the Law of Excluded Middle which states that for every proposition, p, either p or not- p. This approach introduces a third truth-value that I will call middle. Future contingents like (EGGS) and (NA24) are neither true nor false, but rather middle. Assigning an intermediate truth-value to such claims is intended to capture the idea that such statements are “at the present time determined neither positively or negatively” (Łukasiewicz 1930, 53). So the Middlist rejects Premise (1) of the above argument. The lesson to be learned from future contingents is that they are neither true nor false but instead possess an intermediate truth-value.Necessarily, if one knows at t that Q is unsound, then one ought not wonder whether Q at t. Footnote 28

I'm stretching out of reach, but you're just out too far. I've got my arms wide open, waiting for that hug you promised me before you'd leave. I'm still waiting for Friday to happen, the day you were supposed to see me before you moved. I'll always be waiting for more memories to make. As noted above, Todd’s defense of Falsism differs significantly from Prior’s. Todd does not take the falsity of future contingents to be rooted in the fact that ‘will’ is equivalent in meaning to ‘will definitely’ or ‘it is now settled that it will’. Rather he claims that ‘will’ statements presuppose the existence of a unique actual future. Todd claims that future contingent statements of the form ‘It will be the case that p’ are to be anaylzed as: ‘The unique actual future features p’ (Todd, 2016, 789). The reason that all future contingents are false on Todd’s account is because it is false that there is a unique actual future. Following a Russellian analysis of non-denoting definite descriptions, it is false that there will be a sea battle tomorrow because it is false that there is a unique actual future that features one. Customer is responsible for ensuring that their cutting machine supports offered files in this listing. I usually don’t answer, because I assume the one posting the question is looking for guidance from someone older and wiser who can tell her how to know she should prevent further pregnancies, and I don’t have the answer to that. Plus, those are two different questions.How else might the Supervaluationist explain the appropriateness of wondering about future contingents? Interestingly, for a Supervaluationist, betting that the sodium-24 atom will decay tomorrow is not the same as betting that it is true that the sodium-24 atom will decay tomorrow. Footnote 35 Given that (NA24) is a future contingent, a Supervaluationist would be foolish to take the second bet. What about the first? Given the nonequivalence between \(\upvarphi\) and \(\upvarphi\) is true, what if we take my wondering to be not whether it is true that the sodium-24 atom will decay tomorrow, but rather whether the sodium-24 atom will decay tomorrow? Given the Supervaluationist account of future contingents, would wondering be appropriate in this case? Our beautiful family of five, built by adoption and biology, full of life, deep love, disability, trauma, and joy. We were thrilled to be welcoming a fourth child, but this second pregnancy was overwhelmingly challenging from the beginning. As time went on instead of improving, I started to drastically decline in physical health. RELATED: Sometimes Pregnancy is Dark

I pray no one ever has to experience a crisis pregnancy like I did, but I know someone else will, and until you do, you’ll never know the depth of the hurt and pain. Having to make unfathomable choices is the most heart-wrenching thing that can happen to a mother. So my grief leaves me in this place where I struggle between the gratitude I feel for my own life and the deep loss of our daughter. Let us again consider the evil scientist’s promise. A natural way of understanding the promise on the Supervaluationist account is to take it as involving truth and falsity as defined on the account. Suppose the evil scientist promises that he will torture me iff (NA24) is true and send me on a holiday iff (NA24) is false. Given such a promise, wondering would clearly be inappropriate. Knowing that (NA24) is a future contingent, I know that it is satisfied in some histories and unsatisfied in others. So I know that (NA24) is not true, and so I know that I will not be tortured. Footnote 34 And so understanding the promise in this way makes wondering about future contingents inappropriate. I can assume without contradiction that my presence in Warsaw at a certain moment of next year, e.g. at noon on 21 December, is at the present time determined neither positively or negatively. Hence it is possible, but not necessary, that I shall be present in Warsaw at the given time. On this assumption the proposition I shall be in Warsaw at noon on 21 December of next year can at the present time be neither true nor false. For if it were true now, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be necessary, which is contradictory to the assumption. If it were false now, on the other hand, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be impossible, which is also contradictory to the assumption. Therefore the proposition considered is at the moment neither true nor false ... (Łukasiewicz 1930, 53).The wondering doesn’t take away my joy. It doesn’t steal my delight in the children I have. In the midst of the daily crazy that is my life, I often don’t stop to think about it. But the journey of infertility has woven the wondering into my heart, this quiet ache for the children who might have been, the missing of my children in Heaven, and the gap between my children on Earth that is bigger than I had hoped it would be. Field, H. (2015). Mathematical undecidables, metaphysical realism, and equivalent descriptions. In R. E. Auxier, D. R. Anderson, & L. E. Hahn (Eds.), The philosophy of Hilary Putnam (pp. 145–172). Open Court. What exactly are questions? There is no general agreement on the metaphysics of questions and fortunately, exactly what questions are need not concern us. I will follow Friedman in assuming that questions are not propositions (Friedman, 2013, 150). Some take questions to be sets of propositions, where the set of propositions consists of all the possible answers to the question. Others take questions to be open propositions. Footnote 16 Necessarily, if Q is a question pertaining to time t2 and one knows at t1 a true, complete answer-at- t2 to Q, then one ought not wonder at t1 whether Q. Footnote 41